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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA MELLOR, JAMES WHITE,
NEDRA ALLRED, THOMAS PIRTLE
and TGNIA PIRTLE,
PlaintiffsRespondents,
Civil No. 156 39

-vsMARK COOK, BRYANT MADSEN,
KENNETH STRATE,
DefendantsAppellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendants-Appell~nts

appeal the order of the Sixth

Judicial District Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah,
holding the Appellants and their attorney in contempt of court.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The lower court ruled that the Appellants and Thomas R.
Blonquist, their attorney wilfully violated the express terms
of a temporary restraining order within a few hours of a valid
service of said order upon them.
RELIEF ON APPEAL
Respondents seek an affirmation of the lower court's
iudgrnent.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts set
forth in Appellants' brief as an adequate narration of the
circumstances of this case.
ARGUMENT
POii'lT I
JUDGE DEE HAD "AUTHORITY" TO HEAR
AND SIGN THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER.
Appellants first assert that Judge Dee had no
"authority" to hear Plaintiffs-Respondents' Motion for Temper
ary Restraining Order on September 22, 1977.

In Appellants'

attempt to discredit Judge Dee's authority to hear the motion,
they rely on Section 78-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953)
which they claim prohibited Judge Dee from hearing the matter.
That section states as follows:
78-3-14.
Ex parte applications from another
district.
A judge of the district court may, in
his own district, hear any ex parte application,
and make any order concerning the same, in any
action or proceeding pending or about to be commenced in another judicial district, in the
following cases:
(1)
Upon the written request of the judge of the
district in which the action or proceeding is at
the time pending or is about to be commenced.
(2)
When it shall be made to appear by affidavit
to the satisfaction of such judge that the judge
of the district court in which the action or
proceeding is at the time pending or is about.to
be commenced is absent from his district, or is

-2-
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incapacitated, or is disqualified to act therein;
such application shall be made only to the judge
of the adjoining district.
Appellants submit that there was no "written" request
by Judge Tibbs

so that any reassignment would have to come

under subsection (2).

Under that subsection, Appellants sub-

mit that a judge in the Third Judicial District is not
adjoining to the Sixth Judicial District and hence had no
authority to hear the matter.
Appellants' reliance on the above-quoted section is
unfounded.

Subsection (1) of Section 78-3-14 deals with

situations where a Judge wishes to personally assign a hearing
to a Judge of another district.

For example, if Judge Tibbs

had called Judge Dee himself and requested the latter to
handle the hearing for him, the procedure would have had to
follow the guidelines of Subsection 78-3-14(1) and Judge Tibbs
would have had to make a "written request".
Subsection (2) deals with situations where a judge in
a bordering district is asked by the parties themselves to
hear a motion.

In that case, the guidelines require the appli-

cation be made to a judge of an "adjoining district"and can
only be granted where the "adjoining" judge finds through
"affidavit" that the first judge is absent from his district,
is incapacitated, or is disqualified.

Thus, for the present

situation to fall under Subsection 78-3-14(2), the Plaintiffs
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would have had to contact Judge Dee themselves and request the
hearing.

Such was not the case.
The procedure followed herein was not the case of

Judge Tibbs personally contacting Judge Dee, nor was it a case
of the Plaintiffs personally contacting Judge Dee.

It is a

case where Judge Tibbs channelled the assignment of Judge Dee
through the Court Administrator's Office pursuant to Section
78-3-18 et

~·

istrator Act").

of the Utah Code Annotated (1953)("Court AdminIt goes without saying that an assignment of

judges by the Court Administrator's Office falls within the
guidelines of the Court Administrator Act and not within the
framework of the statute regulating assignments by judges
themselves.
The Court Administrator Act establishes an administrative system for Utah courts to provide uniformity and coordination in the administration of justice.

See §78-3-19, Utah

Code Annotated (1953).
Among the powers delegated to the Administrator's
Office by Section 78-3-24 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) are
the following:
(k}
Schedule trials or court sessions and
designate a judge to preside at said trials
or court sessions,

* * *
(m)
Assign judges within courts and throughout
the state, and reassign cases to judges.
(emphasis added).
-4-
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Thus, as Judge Tibbs was out of his district and their
being no other judge therein who could hear Plaintiff's Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order, he called the Court Administrator's Office pursuant to the statute for reassignment of
the hearing of Plaintiff's motion to another judge.

Ronald

w.

Gibson, Assistant Court Administrator thereupon assigned Judge
David Dee of the Third District to sit in Judge Tibbs' stead
and hear the Motion.

(R. at 57).
POINT II

JUDGE DEE HAD "JURISDICTION" TO SIGN THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.
In justifying their decision to ignore the Temporary
Restraining Order, Appellants rely upon Rule 3(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil

Procedur~

which states that jurisdiction of the

court takes effect when a complaint is filed or a surrunons is
served.
Rule 3(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets
out the general rule that a court acquires jurisdiction in a
matter when the complaint is filed or the surrunons is served.
However, it does not prevent the issuance of the summons by
the attorney and placing it in the hands of the sheriff for
service.

Nor does such a rule prevent a court from issuing

orders in a matter, including a temporary restraining order,
~fore the complaint was filed.
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It is clear that a court may issue a temporary
restraining order at any time, not only after a complaint has
been filed, but prior to the actual docketing of the pleadi~.
As a matter of fact,

this is a rather well known practice,

i.e., to present all the papers to the Court for signature

a~

thereafter to file them with the Clerk.
That a court may grant a temporary restraining order
before pleadings are on file is evidenced by the language in
Section 78-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), which is
the section relied heavily upon by Appellants.

This section

deals with the authority of a judge in one district to

assi~

a judge in another district the jurisdiction to hear ex parte
motions.

Although Plaintiff does not believe it necessary to

rely on this section to confer authority on Judge Dee to hear
the Motion (see §78-3-18, et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953)),
the language of the statute is instructive:
A judge of the district court may, in his own
district, hear any ex parte application, and
make any order concerning the same, in any
action or proceeding pending or about to be
commenced in another judicial district . . ·
(Emphasis added)
U.C.A., §78-3-14 (Repl. Vol.
9A 1977)
If, as Appellants suggest, it is necessary for the
complaint to be filed in a case before the court can hear an
ex parte motion, the words "pending or about to be commenced"
are meaningless.

The clear language thereof implies that a
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motion for a temporary restraining order can be heard before
the complaint is filed because that would constitute an action
"about to be commenced."

Judge Dee was informed that the

papers were being taken to Manti for filing later that afternoon,
so he obviously knew the action was "about to be commenced."
Rule 65(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
governs the issuance of injunctions and temporary restraining
orders.

Nowhere therein can be found a requirement that

pleadings must have been previously filed before the court may
issue a temporary restraining order.

To the contrary, language

therein allows for the issuance of such an order before a
complaint has been filed.

Rule 6 5 (A)

( e) provides for the

granting of such an order:
(2)
When it appears from the pleadings or by
affidavit that the commission or continuance of
some act during the litigation would produce great
or irreparable injury to the party seeking
injunctive relief.
(Emphasis added)
This rule should be read in contrast with the preceding subsection which requires the pleadings to be "on file."
Subsection (2)

Under

there is no such requirement.

Rule 65(A)

(e) continues and allows such an order~

(4)
In all other cases where an injunction
would be proper in equity.
It has been stated that "irreparable injury and the
inadequacy of remedy at law" confer equity power upon a court
Md supply the "jurisdictional requisites" to grant the order,

-7-
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42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §269.

Thus, Judge Dee had

jurisdiction at the time he signed the Order because he

fou~

that the board's actions would cause immediate and irreparable
harm.
To argue that a court cannot issue a temporary
restraining order before pleadings have been filed is to
that the court has no equity power.

arg~

In this case Judge Dee
~

had all the pleadings before him when he made his decision

sign the Order and he was informed that the pleadings would be
filed later that afternoon as soon as they could be taken

~

Manti, Utah.
Moreover, Rule 5 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
allows the filing of pleadings by delivering them to the judge
who must note the date thereon and transmit the papers to the
clerk forthwith.

This was done by Judge Dee and the papers

were delivered to Plaintiffs' counsel for transmittal to the
District Court.

Thus, even if the filing of the complaint were :

a prerequisite to the court's obtaining jurisdiction, the
papers were "filed" with Judge Dee.
Even if there were a requirement that some initiai
pleadings be filed before the temporary restraining order
became valid, the filing of the pleadings on the afternoon of
September 22, and prior to service upon the Defendants would
immediately confer jurisdiction upon the Court and the order
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would be effective as issued at that time from the Clerk's
office.

Thus, even if the Defendants' argument had any merit

that Judge Dee had no jurisdiction at 2:15 o'clock p.m. to
sign tBe Order,

jurisdiction would have automatically attached

at 5:00 o'clock p.m. when all the pleadings were filed.

See

e.g. Ballard v. Buist, 8 U.2d 308, 333 P.2d 1071 (1959).
The lower court rightfully held that Judge Dee had
been properly appointed by the Court Administrator's Office,
that Judge Dee had authority to hear the matter, that he had
jurisdiction over the matter even before the filing of the
complaint, and that even if a defect existed, it was cured
through the subsequent filing of the papers with the Sanpete
County Clerk.

(see R. at 178-180.)
POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS AND MR. BLONQUIST WERE
IN CONTEMPT OF THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER.

The Court's Order of September 22, 1977, prohibited
and restrained the Defendants "from appointing a new superintendent of the North Sanpete School District".

Appellants

do not contend that the contemptuous actions were not taken,
but only that their intentional disregard of the restraining
order is not punishable on technical grounds.
Rule 65(d) provides that a restraining order is
binding "upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents,
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servants, employees and attorneys and upon those persons in
active concert or participation with them who receive actual
notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." (emphasis
added) •

(Rule 65(d), U.R.C.P.)

Defendants and their legal

counsel had actual notice of the restraining order.

(R. at 178).

Defendants' counsel knew that Judge Dee had been appointed to
hear the matter in the absence of Judge Tibbs and that the Sworn
Accusation and Order had been filed with the Clerk in Sanpete
County and that it bore the seal of the Court.

(Tr. at 234). In

spite of this, Defendants and their counsel decided to "ignore"
the Order.

(Tr. at 2 3 9, 2 4 0) .

Thereupon the Appellants and each

of them, intentionally and knowingly defied the Court Order and
selected a new Superintendent of Schools for the North
School District.

Sanpe~

Such actions were in contempt of the Court

Order issued earlier that day.

Moreover, acting in good faith

or on the advice of counsel is not a defense available to Defendants.

Gunnison Irrigation co. v. Peterson, 74 Utah 460, 466,

280 P. 715 (1929).
Section 78-32-1 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953)
defines what actions or omissions constitute contempt under Utah

law.

Among those actions listed are:
(5)
Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order
or process of the court.

* * *
( 9)
Any other unlawful interference with the process
or proceedings of a court.
Appellants intentionally defied the Court's Temporary
Restraining Order and were in contempt of court for such dis-
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obedience.

Defendants and their counsel had available to them

the appropriate means to test the order of the Court as suggested
by the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client
to disregard a standing rule of a tribunal or a
ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but he may take appropriate steps in
good faith to test the validity of such rule or
ruling.
Code of Prof. Resp. DR 7-106 (A).
POINT IV
THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANTS AND THEIR LEGAL
COUNSEL IN VIOLATING THE COURT'S ORDER WERE
CONTEMPTUOUS EVEN IF THE ORDER WAS INVALID.
Appellants argue that disobedience of an "unlawful"
order is not punishable as contempt.

Respondents assume that

"unlawful" is meant thereby to connote "invalidity" due to lack
of jurisdiction.

Respondents submit that a temporary restraining

order of the court is not "unlawful", nor "invalid" until set
aside through "orderly" mea:ps.
In Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.
1959), the court considered the question of contempt.

The

lower court had issued an injunction restraining the school
district from segregation within the schools.
was violated

and

That injunction

contempt proceedings were had.

The defendants

argued that they could not be guilty of contempt because the
~junction was invalid.

The sixth circuit held that the injunc-

tion was valid, but stated:
Even if the injunction was invalid, app~llan~ wa~
chargeable with criminal contempt for vi~lating it,
for the order of the District Court was in full
force and effect until set aside in an orderly way.
(Cites omitted) 265 F.2d at 691.
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Likewise, the parties in this case had an obligation to obey

t~

Order even if invalid and should have tried to set the Order
aside through "orderly" means rather than simply decide to choose
whether they wanted to obey the authority of this Court.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that one may be
punished for contempt for violating a temporary restraining
order even if the court subsequently found that it could not
make the injunction permanent.

In Hayes v. Towles, 95 Idaho

208, 506 P.2d 105 (1973), the court said:
The order violated by the petitioner was in the
nature of a temporary restraining order issued
pending a determination of jurisdiction.
In
general, a court has the power to order the preservation of the status quo while it determines
its own authority to grant relief, and the violation of a restraining order issued for that purpose
may be punished as criminal contempt, even if the
court subsequently determines that it is without
jurisdiction to grant the ultimate relief requested.
506 P.2d at 109.
Appellants reliance on the case of In Re Rogers I Estate, r
I

75 Utah 290, 284 P. 992

(1930) is unwarranted.

That case dealt

with a probate court order which exceeded the bounds of jurisdiction granted probate courts under the statutory laws of Utah.

W

the present case, we are not dealing with the question of whether
a temporary restraining order can ever be issued by a district
court, but only with the question of the timing of the order.
Unlike Rogers, Appellants make no claims that the temporary

II

restraining order exceeded the jurisdictional grant o f th e distric:I
court.
The Defendants and their counsel shou ld h ave Soug ht to. I
challenge the order or waited until the hearing of the preliminar :
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

l

injunction.

For them to have substituted their own judgment

as to the validity of the order is unacceptable.

In this

regard our own Utah Supreme Court has stated:
"The defendant in this case was bound to obey the
injunction, and, when he interfered with the
court's order, he was acting at his peril. He
certainly ought not to have acted upon his own
judgment as to what his rights were, when it was
manifest that his acts would, at least, amount
to a technical violation of the terms of the injunction.
It was not for him to set up his own
opinion as to the meaning and effect of the injunction.
If he entertained any doubt as to
what he might do without violating the injunction,
he should have applied to the court for a modif ication of the injunction, or for the privilege of
doing certain acts which, by the advice of counsel,
he claims he had the right to do." Gunnison
Irrigation co. v. Peterson, supra at 74 U. 466.

POINT V
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
OVER THIS APPEAL.
On May 1, 1978, fhe parties orally argued Respondents'
Motion To Dismiss.

The basis behind Respondents' motion was

that no timely notice of appeal had been filed by either Mr.
Blonguist, nor the three Defendant Board Members.

On that

same date, this Court denied the motion to dismiss and the
parties continued with the appeal.
Despite the fact that no Notice of Appeal was filed
within one month after the contempt order was signed and
entered, the thrust of Appellants argument was that the order
appealed from was continuing in nature in that the court reserved
l~isdiction thereon as to a possible jail sentence and award

I
1

of attorneys fees.
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Such an argument flies in the face of the one month
requirement to file a Notice of Appeal.
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).

(See Rule 73(a) of

Appellants are not appealing

the punishment ordered by the court, but only the correctness
of the finding of the contempt order itself.
does not object to any error in the fines,

Appellants' brief

jail sentence, or

award of attorneys fees ordered by the lower court, but only
object to whether or not they were in contempt.

The contempt

order was made on September 30, 1977 and entered in December
12, 19 7 7.

(R. at 177-180).

January 25, 1978.

The Notice of Appeal was filed

(R. at 197).

Every order to which Appellants

object was made on September 30, 1977.
Furthermore, the fact that the court retained jurisdiction of both the main case and the issues of the suspended
jail sentence and of attorney's fees on the contempt charge
does not toll the period of time in which a notice of appeal
was required by Rule 73(a).

In re Estate of Voorhees, 12 Utah

2d 361, 366 P. 2d 977 (1961)

dealt with a problem where the

court made an order but retained jurisdiction to decide further
related matters.

This court held that the appealing party

only had one month from the date of the first adjudication in
which to appeal that order, stating:
"However, cutting through the brush of attempted
procedural forensics, it will be seen that the
real issue between the parties and before the
court has whether the mountain ground belonged
to Mrs. Voorhees or to the estate.
Upon plenary
hearing thereon, the issue was resolved ag~inst
her.
The fact that the court retained jurisdiction as mentioned above to adjudicate further
matters did not leave open for reconsideration
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--the question as to who owned that property. There
was nothing further to be decided on that particular issue and she was ordered to transfer it to
the estate.
That being so, the decree entered
thereon was final and therefore appealable.
Since
she took no appeal within the time allowed by law,
that decree is conclusive." 366 P. 2d at 980.

In the present case, the contempt order was final and the court's
retention of jurisdiction does not toll the appeal time.

The

Notice of Appeal filed January 25, 1978 was not timely and this
court "is compelled to order a dismissal thereof" if it makes
such a finding.

In Re Estate of Ratliff, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431

'.2d 571, 574-75

(1967).
CONCLUSION

If a party can make himself a judge of the validity
of orders which have been issued, and by his own
act of disobedience set them aside, then are the
courts impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly calls the "judicial power of the United States"
would be a mere mockery.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co. 221 US 418, 450, 55 L. ed 797, 809, 31 S. Ct.
492, 34 LRA (NS) 874 (1911).
(Cited in United States
v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 at
288, 67 s.ct. at 694, 91 L.ed at 884 (1946).
Plaintiffs-Respondents pray for affirrnance of the
~wer court's order,

in addition to awarding to the Plaintiffs

their costs and reasonable legal fees on this appeal.

I

I

Arthur H. Nielsen
Earl Jay Peck
Bruce J. Nelson
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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